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Abstract—Internet censors seek ways to identify and
block internet access to information they deem objection-
able. Increasingly, censors deploy advanced networking
tools such as deep-packet inspection (DPI) to identify
such connections. In response, activists and academic
researchers have developed and deployed network traffic
obfuscation mechanisms. These apply specialized crypto-
graphic tools to attempt to hide from DPI the true nature
and content of connections.
In this survey, we give an overview of network traffic
obfuscation and its role in circumventing Internet cen-
sorship. We provide historical and technical background
that motivates the need for obfuscation tools, and give
an overview of approaches to obfuscation used by state
of the art tools. We discuss the latest research on how
censors might detect these efforts. We also describe the
current challenges to censorship circumvention research
and identify concrete ways for the community to address
these challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Around the world, well-resourced governments seek to
censor the Internet. Censorship is driven by the desires
of governments to control access to information deemed
politically or socially sensitive, or to protect national
economic interests. For example, in China performing
Internet searches for information on Tiananmen square
reveals no information about the events in 1989, and
communication platforms run by companies outside
China, such as GMail and Twitter, are among those that
are routinely blocked. Although China’s “Great Firewall”
is perhaps the best known example of Internet censorship
by a nation-state, similar controls are enacted in Turkey,
Iran, Malaysia, Syria, Belarus and many other countries.1
In this article we will focus on the technical under-
pinnings of automated censorship and of the network
traffic obfuscation tools aimed at circumventing it. By
automated censorship, we mean government deployed or
mandated network monitoring equipment that is typically
installed at Internet service providers (ISPs). These sys-
tems detect and disrupt the flow of censored information
without any direct human involvement and are applied
broadly to enforce government policies over all citizens.
1An excellent survey of the censorship policies by various gov-
ernments around the world is provided by the OpenNet Initiative
https://opennet.net/.
This differs from targeted approaches to taking down
Internet content, such as the United States government’s
take-down of the Silk Road, which was an Internet
marketplace for illicit goods such as drugs and weapons.
We will first review how modern deep-packet inspec-
tion (DPI) devices enable censors to filter traffic based
on the application-layer content they contain, e.g., search
terms, requested URLs, filetypes, and information that
identifies the application itself. We will then explore the
technical methods used to obfuscate application-layer
content, in order to minimize the usefulness of DPI.
These make intimate use of cryptography, though in non-
standard ways. We place the methods into one of three
categories: those that randomize every bit of packet pay-
loads, those that transform payloads so that they mimic
typical “benign” traffic (e.g., HTTP messages), and those
that tunnel payloads through actual implementations of
network protocols (e.g., a VPN or HTTPS proxy). Each
category comes with its own set of assumptions about
the censor’s approach, and targets a different point in the
security/performance design space.
We then discuss the challenges to progress faced by
researchers in this area. Chief among these is the dearth
of solid information about the technical capabilities of
real-world censors, and their sensitivities to filtering
errors (both missing targeted traffic and blocking non-
targeted traffic). Similarly, we lack understanding about
real-world users of censorship-circumvention tools. In
both cases, even gathering such information presents
significant challenges, as we will see.
The final contribution of this article is to suggest
concrete tasks and research efforts that would give con-
siderable aid to the design of future obfuscation tools.
II. BACKGROUND: FROM CENSORSHIP TO
PROTOCOL OBFUSCATION
In what follows, we will use terms like “censor”,
“adversary” and “sensitive flow” repeatedly. To aid un-
derstanding, we provide a summary of such key terms
in Fig. 1.
The technical means of automated censorship assumes
that the censor enjoys privileged access to network
infrastructure. Governments typically have this via direct
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Sensitive
flow
Network communications targeted for being
offensive, counter-regime, or using obfuscation
tools
Censor,
Adversary
The party that controls the communication
network and is attempting to identify and
restrict sensitive flows of information
Obfuscation
tool
Software designed to prevent censors from
identifying/blocking communications
Background
traffic
Non-sensitive flows coexisting (potentially) with
sensitive flows on the network
Collateral
damage
Background traffic adversely affected by
censor’s efforts to control sensitive flows
Proxy
Party who will forward traffic to broader
Internet on behalf of censored client; external to
censor-controlled network
Fig. 1. Summary of often-used technical terms.
or indirect control of Internet service providers (ISPs).
In the security community this is called an on-path
adversary: it is on the path of network packets between
the user seeking to access sensitive content, and the
provider of that content (e.g., a web server).
A. Traffic Identification Methods
Network censors face two main tasks: to accurately
identify network traffic that carries or attempts to access
sensitive content, and (potentially) to perform a censor-
ing action on that traffic. Examples of the latter are drop-
ping packets to degrade the user’s experience, forcing
one or both of the endpoints to drop the connection
(e.g. by sending TCP reset messages), and redirecting
web connections to a censor-controlled web server. But
as censoring actions must be preceded by identification
of targeted traffic, we focus only on the censor’s identi-
fication task.
Address-based identification. Originally, attempts to
access censored Internet content were identified by first
associating addressing information — IP addresses and
port numbers, domain names — with sensitive content,
resulting in a blacklist of addresses. Any network con-
nections to these addresses were deemed as attempts to
access sensitive content. For blacklisted domain names,
the censor can direct ISPs to run modified DNS software.
Connections to these domains are then typically blocked
or misdirected. For IP addresses, the censor can install
hardware mechanisms at ISPs that compare information
in a packet’s IP header against the list. As the IP headers
appear early in the packet, one needs only to perform
“shallow” packet inspection, disregarding information
encapsulated deeper in the packet. TCP or UDP port
information is similarly available via shallow inspection.
A user can avoid both domain-name- and IP/port-
based identification by using a proxy, a cooperative
Proxy(network(
DPI(box(
Na3onal(networks( Censored((
website(
…(
Fig. 2. Proxy-based circumvention of censorship. A client connects
to a proxy server that relays its traffic to the intended destination. It
may send the traffic through multiple proxies before the destination
should anonymity be desired.
machine whose address information is not blacklisted.
The operation of proxy-based circumvention is sum-
marized by the diagram in Fig. 2. Many tools such
as Tor, uProxy, Anonymizer, and Psiphon rely on the
use of proxies.2 Recently, domain fronting [6], a form
of decoy routing [8], [10], [20] that operates at the
application layer, has also been successfully deployed
and is discussed further in Sec. III.
Identification via deep-packet inspection. The success
of proxy systems in practice has led censors to deploy
new DPI mechanisms that identify traffic based on
information deeper inside the network packets. For ex-
ample, application-layer content carried in (unencrypted)
packet payloads can divulge user-generated data, such as
keywords within search URLs. We already noted China’s
Great Firewall blocking traffic that contains blacklisted
keywords.
In reaction to DPI, modern circumvention tools sys-
tems encrypt content to proxies, preventing this kind of
keyword search. The result has been that sophisticated
modern censors now use DPI to attempt to identify
and block traffic created by circumvention tools. For
example, China used DPI to detect Tor connections by
looking for a specific sequence of bytes in the first
application-layer message from client to server. This
sequence corresponds to the TLS cipher suites that were
selected by Tor clients, which were unlike those selected
by other TLS implementations. As another example,
Iran used DPI to determine the expiration date of TLS
certificates. At the time, Tor servers used certificates with
relatively near expiration dates, while most commercial
TLS servers chose expiration dates that are many years
away.
These blocking policies used fairly sophisticated in-
formation about the circumvention tool —the particular
implementation of TLS— being carried in packet pay-
loads. But even a crude scan of application-layer content
can discover that standard protocols (e.g. SSH, TLS)
are being transported. This may be enough to trigger
insensitive blocking, or logging of source/destination IP
2These tools are available online at: https://torproject.org, https://
www.uproxy.org, https://anonymizer.com, https://psiphon3.com
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addresses for more detailed analysis or later action.
B. Network Traffic Obfuscation
The use of DPI to perform tool identification moti-
vated the circumvention-tool community to seek counter-
measures, culminating now in an entire area of research
and development: network traffic obfuscation. The goal
is to force DPI-using censors to abandon attempts at
protocol identification, because accurate identification
at-scale requires prohibitive resources. For example, by
developing tools whose traffic can reliably force DPI to
misclassify the traffic as that of a non-blacklisted tool.
It is network traffic obfuscation that we will concern
ourselves with in the remainder of this paper.
We want to emphasize that our focus on obfusca-
tion does not belie the importance of other aspects of
censorship circumvention. IP- and DNS-based filtering
are still more prevalent than DPI-based mechanisms,
and circumventing such filtering remains a challenge in
practice. Ultimately circumvention requires a variety of
mechanisms that work in concert to defeat a censor and
a system is only as good as its weakest link.
Network traffic obfuscation threat-models. A threat
model is a particular combination of censor capabilities
and goals. We will provide only informal description
of threat models for the purposes of this article. We
emphasize that the threat models presented here apply
only to gathering information from network flows (IP
information, application-layer content, etc.), and not to
censoring actions (blocking or otherwise disrupting the
communication) that this information enables. Infor-
mation may be gathered by using passive or active
techniques.
A passive technique simply observes traffic flows.
One high-profile example of passive techniques occurred
during the February 2012 anniversary of the 1979 Iranian
revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran mounted a
large-scale censorship campaign, blocking various IP
addresses associated with anti-censorship tools such as
torproject.org, and using DPI-based identification of TLS
network flows.3
An active technique modifies existing packet contents
or injects completely new packets. Examples of active
attacks that manipulate connections by modifying or
dropping specific packets have appeared in the academic
literature [7]. While far less common than passive tech-
niques, active techniques have been used by the Chinese
government in order to identify Tor proxies [18]. We give
a list of example passive and active attacks in Fig. 3. For
brevity, in the remainder of the paper we focus primarily
on passive attackers.
3See: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/
iran-partially-blocks-encrypted-network-traffic
So far we have spoken mostly about the capabilities
part of the threat model. In terms of the goals, the typical
assumption is that censors minimally want to accurately
classify traffic as either targeted (for application of
policy) or not. Accuracy has two facets. The first is
a high true-positive rate, meaning that the fraction of
targeted traffic that is marked as such is close to one.
The second is a low false-positive rate, meaning that
the fraction of non-target traffic incorrectly marked as
targeted is close to zero. Obfuscation tools are often said
to be unobservable if they can cause sufficiently low
true-positive and high false-positive rates. What consti-
tutes sufficient error rates, however, is largely unknown.
However, tools with the potential to induce high false-
positive rates are preferred as it is argued that censors
will be less likely to block them. Let us say more about
why.
Sensitivity to collateral damage. Collateral damage oc-
curs when a censor’s detection mechanisms suffer from
false-positives, leading to mislabeling network flows as
associated to a blacklisted tool, protocol, or content
when, in fact, the flow is not. Why should censors be sen-
sitive to collateral damage? The answer is highly context
dependent, varies over time, and is ultimately a question
of socio-political factors. The example of the February
2012 censorship campaign by Iran is an example of
insensitive censorship (since the vast majority of TLS
traffic was almost certainly not used for circumvention
or bound for hosts deemed offensive by the regime). We
note that this particularly broad censorship policy lasted
for only a short period of time, and that it is is typical
for censorship policies to change, in terms of targets
and sensitivity, over time. We will discuss later how
measuring sensitivity remains a critical open research
challenge.
III. OBFUSCATION APPROACHES
Use of DPI by censors has inspired researchers and
activists to explore a variety of countermeasures aimed at
obfuscating packet payloads. We break down approaches
into four categories: encryption, randomization, mimicry,
and tunneling.
Encryption. A natural first thought is that conventional
encryption is already a good obfuscator. Indeed, encryp-
tion renders unintelligible the data that is encrypted.
But most encryption protocols have plaintext headers
in each packet payload that identify the protocol itself,
and sometimes indicate the particular application that is
implementing the protocol. We’ve seen in Iran and China
that plaintext headers contain fingerprintable parameters
that can help a censor distinguish between, say, Tor’s
implementation of TLS from non-Tor implementations.
In short, just encrypting data does not guarantee a level
3
Country Dates Techniques and Targets Passive/Active
China 2007– IP/DNS blacklisting, Tor TLS header fingerprinting, Tor-relay handshake probe Both
Iran Feb. 2012 IP blacklisting, keyword flagging, TLS handshake fingerprinting Passive
Turkey Early 2014 IP/DNS blacklisting, BGP hijack of Twitter and Youtube Both
Pakistan Intermittent IP/DNS blacklisting, URL, keyword, and filetype flagging Passive
Syria 2011– IP/DNS blacklisting, instant message fingerprinting, social media keyword blacklisting Passive
Ethiopia 2012 Skype detection, Tor TLS fingerprinting Passive
Belarus 2014– IP/DNS blacklisting, filtering according to packet content Passive
Kazakhstan 2012 Encryption fingerprinting, Tor TLS handshake fingerprinting Passive
Egypt 2014– IP/DNS blacklisting, instant message fingerprinting, social media keyword blacklisting Passive
Fig. 3. Examples of censorship by nation states. Techniques and targets in bold rely on DPI.
of unobservability sufficient for the goal of making DPI
unreliable for censors.
Randomization. If conventional encryption, like plain-
text protocols, can leave exploitable fingerprints for DPI,
why not attempt to randomize every byte in the packet
payload? This strategy has been described as attempting
to make network flows “look like nothing” by the obfs
family of obfuscators [14], and is a strategy also used
by Dust [17] and ScrambleSuit [19]. ScrambleSuit and
the obfs methods are designed specifically for the Tor
pluggable transport framework called “Obfsproxy”.
The standard approach to randomizing a payload is
to apply a stream cipher to every byte. Assuming a
passive censor that does not have access to the stream
cipher secret key, this approach makes protocol identi-
fication difficult because there are no fixed fingerprints
to observe. Because stream ciphers do not provide the
strong confidentiality and authenticity guarantees sought,
they are typically applied on top of modern encryption
methods that do.
Underlying the use of randomizing, “look-like-
nothing” obfuscators is the assumption that censors use
only blacklisting: they allow all traffic except that which
conforms to an explicit set of disallowed traffic types.
If censors use whitelisting, exclusively or in addition
to blacklisting, then fully randomized payloads will not
avoid censorship. This is by virtue of looking like no
actual network traffic.
Mimicry. To address whitelisting censors, a class of
obfuscation methods attempt to evade censorship by
masquerading as a whitelisted protocol. Loosely, rather
than trying to look like nothing, mimicry-based obfus-
cators try to make packet payloads look like something
that they are not, but that will be identified by DPI
as allowable. A common example is to make payloads
look like HTTP, which is rarely blocked because of
its ubiquity. Mimicry in the context of anti-censorship
originates with the Tor project prepending HTTP headers
to Tor packets [14], though mimicry can be thought of
as steganography against a particular type of adversary
(DPI systems). Stegotorus [16] and SkypeMorph [13],
for example, attempted to use steganographic approaches
to look like HTTP and Skype traffic, respectively. Un-
fortunately they have prohibitively poor performance.
A minimalist but flexible approch to mimicry can
be found in format-transforming encryption (FTE) [11].
As implemented in Tor, uProxy and elsewhere, FTE
allows programmers to use regular expressions to specify
the format of ciphertexts. Because regular expressions
are also used by DPI, one can often precisely force
misclassification of the protocol.
Mimicry obfuscators attempt to make packet payloads
look like a particular “cover” protocol, but do not
actually use an implementation of the targeted cover.
This means that the syntax and semantics of messages
emanating from mimicry systems may deviate, often
significantly, from that of messages conforming to the
cover protocol. As one example, a mimicking obfuscator
may produce a message purporting to be an HTTP GET
after having just received a message purporting to be an
HTTP GET, thereby violating proper HTTP semantics.
Tunneling. Instead of custom obfuscation implementa-
tions of mimicry that reproduces some aspects of the
cover protocol, tunneling obfuscators transmit messages
produced by an actual implementation of the cover
protocol. Tunneling is of course not something new
to obfuscation: all proxy systems use tunneling over
encrypted channels. So any VPN or HTTPS proxy might
be considered a tunneling obfuscator. The key difference
is that tunneling obfuscators are meant to obfuscate that
an anti-censorship tool is being used, and sometimes
even obfuscate that encryption is being used. A VPN
or proxy may not (attempt to) hide such facts.
A notable example of a tunneling obfuscator is the
Tor pluggable transport Meek [6]. Meek tunnels via TLS
to HTTP load-balancers operated by Google, Amazon
CloudFront, or Microsoft Azure. This is referred to
as “domain fronting” because the ostensible domain
revealed at the TCP layer (and so, in the clear) is
google.com (say), but the underlying encrypted re-
quest is for a domain that routes to a Meek-enabled
Tor relay.4 As with Tor-TLS, the Meek obfuscator is
at pains to ensure that tunneled Tor-connections to the
load balancer look like conventional TLS connections to
4Interestingly, a similar use of domain fronting was employed by
the GoAgent system and was popular in China in 2013.
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the load balancer. It’s worth noting that this approach
relies on an undocumented “feature” of load-balancer
implementations, and it is conceivable that companies
may modify future load balancers in a way that prevents
domain fronting.
The table appearing in Fig. 4 summarizes a range
of obfuscators that have been deployed and compares
them qualitatively in terms of deployment, how keys
are exchanged (should encryption be used to perform
obfuscation), and performance. It also includes a sum-
mary of attacks that have been explored against them, as
discussed in Sec. IV.
IV. SEEING THROUGH OBFUSCATION
Can real censors detect obfuscators? Researchers have
begun preliminary investigations into this question, and
we will summarize their approaches here focusing on
passive techniques. The takeaway message from what
follows is that the answer is not yet clear.
Syntactic and semantic mismatch. The first intensive
investigation into obfuscator detection is the work of
Houmansadr, Brubaker, and Shmatikov [7]. They focus
on mimicry systems in particular, and claim that all
such systems are fundamentally flawed because they will
never perfectly replicate all aspects of a target protocol
implementation.
They look specifically at the extent to which messages
emitted by currently implemented systems abide by the
proper syntax or semantics of the cover protocol. By
syntax we mean that the emitted messages are parsable
as cover protocol messages — required headers are in
the right places, the correct character sets are used,
etc. Semantics refers instead to whether messages are
meaningful relative to the proper functioning of the
protocol.
Most mimicry systems explicitly made no attempt to
mimic all aspects of the cover protocol, making the
search for syntactic and semantic mismatches a foregone
conclusion. As examples, Stegotorus doesn’t implement
most of HTTP, and the packets sent when using FTE (in
a way that favors performance) contains large numbers of
random, unformatted bits. The authors show how to take
advantage of such mismatches. In particular, they detail a
number of ways to detect Stegotorus, SkypeMorph, and
CensorSpoofer. None of these obfuscators are actually in
use (although for reasons unrelated to security), and so
these attacks were only tested against simulated stand-ins
for deployed systems. It is possible that real deployments
would be more (or less!) vulnerable to their attack
methods.
We also note that the authors did not measure the
collateral damage of their tests, i.e., to what extent the
attacks they develop would misclassify benign cover-
protocol traffic as obfuscated. Subsequent work [15]
showed that some of their tests would lead to a false
positive rate of 37% if naively deployed, while others
appear effective at avoiding collateral damage.
Entropy tests. The semantic and syntactic checks above
will not help one identify the use of randomizing ob-
fuscators, as these explicitly try to look like no actual
protocol. Wang et al. [15] evaluated the use of efficient
entropy tests in the context of detection of randomizing
obfuscators. Their techniques focus on a small window
of bytes occurring in the first few messages of an ob-
served flow. The intuition for why this works is that the
packets emitted by all non-obfuscated protocols always
contain some plaintext headers, whereas randomizers by
definition have random data in these locations. They
showed their test against obfsproxy achieved a rela-
tively low false-positive rate of only 0.2% when used
against non-obfuscated network traces collected from
a university campus. Whether or not this constitutes a
sufficiently small false-positive rate in practice is both
context-dependent and unclear.
Traffic analysis. Even without parsing packet pay-
loads to exploit the actual byte values being carried,
obfuscator-produced traffic may exhibit packet lengths,
inter-packet timings and directional traffic patterns that
deviate from the background network traffic. Using such
meta-data to infer information about communications is
referred to as traffic analysis.
One example of deviant traffic behavior arises in
Meek. Conventionally, HTTPS connections involve two
message flows, one smaller upstream request (client to
server), and then a longer downstream message con-
taining the requested content. With Meek, however,
the client must frequently send requests to see if new
data is available. To a network DPI system, this may
stand out as an uncharacteristically large number of
upstream messages. The ability to exploit this by a DPI
was investigated by Wang et al., who gave a machine-
learning-based approach that detected Meek with true
positive rate of 0.98 and false positive rate of 0.0002 or
less. But their detector may not be easy to use in practice
as it only worked well when trained and tested on traces
from the same network environment.
For fear of traffic analysis, some obfuscators include
mechanisms to try to randomize meta-data such as packet
lengths and packet inter-arrival time. Such countermea-
sures borrow techniques from the extensive literature on
website fingerprinting and its countermeasures [9]. How
effective these countermeasures are in the obfuscation
context is unknown.
V. CHALLENGES AND OPEN QUESTIONS
So far, we have provided an overview of the rapid
evolution of censorship and censorship-evasion technolo-
gies in the context of network traffic obfuscation. Now
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Obfuscator Type Deployment Key exchange Perf. Attacks Notes
Cirripede [8] tunneling In-band (TLS) with
pre-registration
High Requires on-path cooperating
ISP/routers
CloudTransport [1] tunneling In-band (TLS) Moderate Google or Amazon HTTPS, cloud
storage as rendezvous
Collage [2] mimicry n/a Low Embed in user-generated content,
use content servers as rendezvous
Decoy Routing [10] tunneling Out-of-band High Requires on-path cooperating routers
Dust [17] randomizer uProxy Out-of-band High Stream cipher w/ transmitted key
material
FTE [11] mimicry Lantern, Tor,
uProxy
Out-of-band High [15] Flexible DPI-regex matching of
HTTP, SSH, SMTP, etc.
Flashproxy [5] tunneling Tor n/a Moderate Plaintext tunnel using websockets
through browser-based proxies
Infranet [4] mimicry In-band private Low Modulate sequence of HTTP re-
quests to send data
Marionette [3] mimicry Out-of-band Moderate Programmable mimicry including
stateful and statistical properties
Domain Fronting
(e.g. Meek [6])
tunneling Tor, Psiphon,
Lantern,
uProxy,
Psiphon,
GoAgent
In-band (TLS) Moderate [15] Google or Amazon HTTPS
Non-PT Tor tunneling Tor In-band (TLS) High [18] Non-Tor TLS
obfs{2,3} [14] randomizer Tor Out-of-band High [15] Full encryption of messages
obfs4 [14] randomizer Tor, Lantern In-band private High [15] Uniform key exchange, full encryp-
tion of messages
ScrambleSuit [19] randomizer Tor In-band private High [15] Uniform key exchange, full encryp-
tion of messages
SkypeMorph [13] mimicry Out-of-band (Skype) Low [7] Mimics Skype connections
Stegotorus [16] mimicry In-band private Low [7] Mimics HTTP connections
Telex [20] tunneling In-band (modified
TLS)
High Requires on-path cooperating
ISP/routers
Fig. 4. Comparison of network obfuscation approaches. Types correspond to our classifications of randomizer, mimicry, or tunneling. Any
notable deployments are listed. The performance column (“Perf.”) is qualitative and based upon numbers reported in the original work.
we turn to the many open questions and challenges
that remain. We cluster them into three general areas:
understanding users, understanding censors, and future-
proofing obfuscation systems. Within each of these areas,
we call out specific tasks that need addressing.
A. Understanding Users
Beyond anecdotes and folklore, very little is un-
derstood about the users of censorship-circumvention
tools, and this hamstrings the development of effective
tools. Research that takes a principled approach to
understanding users and their situations could lead to
significant improvements. But performing user studies
in this context is particularly challenging. The use of
censorship-circumvention tools is illegal in some places
and, in extreme cases, exposing users could put them in
physical danger.
Develop guidelines for user studies. The research com-
munity might produce guidelines for performing ethical
human subjects research in this space.5 These guidelines
5Standard IRB-style human subjects reviews are also important, but
could be complemented by further community-driven guidelines.
would do well to account for regional and cultural
differences, reflect the challenge of obtaining informed
consent, and perform measurement in a transparent yet
privacy-sensitive way.
Perform user studies. The guidelines could be put
to use in the design of ethical research studies. Key
questions that might be addressed include: What makes
users decide to use a system, or not? How do users
first learn of the availability of tools and then obtain
them? What are user perceptions regarding risk, ethics,
and legality of tool use? How do users react to different
kinds of performance or functionality loss when using
circumvention tools? How important is it to users that
they be able to convincingly deny that they used a tool?
B. Understanding Censors
Perhaps the most important theme emerging from
this paper is that researchers do not yet have a clear
understanding of the adversary. This prevents us from
knowing whether or not a proposed obfuscation method
is truly “broken” or targets an appropriate design trade-
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offs between security, performance, and usability.
Characterize “normal” traffic. Circumvention tech-
nologies depend on sensitivity to collateral damage, but
at present we lack models for how normal, unobfuscated
traffic appears to DPI systems. This is especially impor-
tant for mimicry-based obfuscators which, by design, try
to avoid detection by appearing to be normal traffic.
So far, researchers have either generated synthetic
data sets or, in one case [15], gathered traces from a
university’s networks. The problem with synthetic traces,
and even university network captures, is that they are
unlikely to properly represent the wide diversity of traffic
that censors observe.
One approach here would be to develop partnerships
with large network operators (e.g. ISPs) in order to
perform studies. We note that for obfuscation research,
one unfortunately needs what’s referred to as full-
packet capture, i.e. the entire packet contents, including
application-layer data. This could have significant pri-
vacy implications for the users of the network, so special
care is demanded. Perhaps researchers could develop
new techniques for doing studies without ever storing
packets, and/or incorporate other privacy mechanisms
(c.f., [12]). This would improve the privacy of such
studies and, one hopes, reduce reluctance of network
operators to help perform them.
One powerful artifact of such studies would be useful
models of “normal” traffic in various settings. These
could be used to build more accurate simulations to
support further analysis and tool testing. What would
make a model “useful” is not currently well defined.
Models of collateral damage. It seems clear that our
threat models must account for the sensitivity of censors
to collateral damage. Underlying all censorship circum-
vention tools is the assumption that censors want to limit
collateral damage, at least to some extent. There are a
number of open questions here.
First is characterizing what types of collateral damage
are of concern to censors. We expect that tolerance to
false-positives varies from country to country, and across
time within a single country. Moreover, not all collateral
damage is the same: it may be that causing collateral
damage of certain forms is more costly to censors in
terms of political or economic repercussions. Domain
fronting systems, such as CloudTransport and Meek both
rely on the hope that blocking popular cloud services,
e.g. those provided by Google or Amazon, is untenable.
However, some countries like China have blocked such
services entirely for periods of time. A methodology
for systems to reason about collateral damage is clearly
needed.
The challenge is for models to incorporate parameters
in a way that captures informal statements of the form
“the censor will not tolerate more than an n% false-
positive rate.” Few existing works attempt to measure
false-positive rates in any sort of methodical manner.
Absent of such attempts, we have no way to state that
a given technique will induce collateral damage that is
intolerable to the modeled censor.
A starting point would be to build threat models
parameterized by false-positive rates and standardized
methods to identify network traffic. Researchers could
then present receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves with their approach. ROC curves and measures
such as area-under-the-curve (AUC) are already standard
practice in machine learning, and we recommend bring-
ing these forms of analysis to circumvention technology
development.
Accessible censorship adversary labs. Given the
widespread and increasing use of commercial DPI de-
vices, good threat models should be informed by what
devices can reasonably be expected to do now and in
the near future — what computational tasks can they
perform (regular expression matching? full parsing of
packet payloads? intensive statistical tests?), how much
state can they keep (a single packet? all packets in a
TCP connection? all connections from a particular IP
address?). This assessment will be context-dependent:
it will be impacted by the volume of traffic and the
assumed sensitivity to collateral damage. This suggest
that a hierarchy of threat models should be developed to
guide building useful systems, rather than attempting to
get consensus on a single model.
A hurdle has been obtaining access to the kinds
of equipment used by censors. DPI systems are ex-
pensive proprietary devices, and they come with re-
strictive licensing agreements that typically prevent any
benchmarking. This means that researchers, even if they
purchase one, may be contractually obligated not to
perform research with them. While hardware itself can
often be purchased second-hand on sites like Ebay, they
may have out-of-date software and not fully reflect the
abilities of fully updated deployments.
The community would benefit from a concerted effort
to overcome these hurdles, with the goal of building
a widely usable censorship lab. The lab would need
to obtain realistic, preferably state of the art, devices
with realistic configurations. Less restrictive licensing
would need to be negotiated. We might look to previous
scientific infrastructure projects for inspiration, such as
PlanetLab, CloudLab, and the National Cyber Range. We
envision such a lab acting as a repository for reference
datasets of “normal” traffic (as discussed above), in ad-
dition to well providing a battery of existing censorship
tools. Ideally, the lab would support remote access for
researchers.
7
C. Future-proofing Obfuscation Systems
We expect that user studies and better understanding
of censors will yield significant insights into how to build
better circumvention systems. Eventually our goal should
be to adapt to, or even defuse, the current armsrace,
and give to developers the techniques needed to have
future-proof obfuscation mechanisms. By this we mean
mechanisms that can maintain connectivity for users
even in the face of adaptive censors that know the design
of the system. We now summarize the research directions
needed to achieve this.
Develop formal foundations for obfuscation research.
Currently there is a dearth of formal abstractions —
formal threat models in particular — upon which to
lay principled foundations for obfuscation. One approach
is to follow the lead of modern cryptographic the-
ory, where giving precise adversarial models, security
goals, and syntax for primitives are primary research
considerations. This approach enables clear scientific
discussion and objective comparison of systems relative
to specified adversarial models. In short, good models
are a significant aid in the development of new tools.
Unlike traditional cryptographic problems, where
efficient constructions have been shown to meet
very pessimistic adversarial models, the censorship-
circumvention setting may be one that benefits from
more realistic models, informed and evolved by experi-
mental evidence and measurements from the field.
Build general frameworks. Obfuscation mechanisms
have mostly been built with a particular target cir-
cumvention system in mind. But obfuscation methods
designed for a specific circumvention system may not
be easily adapted for another. For example, Tor is TCP-
based, so Tor-oriented obfuscation methods need not
consider unreliable transports, but I2P and uProxy must.
To have broader impact, the obfuscation community
would benefit from general libraries and frameworks.
In addition to cutting down on aggregate implementa-
tion effort, having broadly useful obfuscation libraries
could facilitate rapid rollouts of countermeasures to
new attacks — not every tool would need to have a
different patch developed. Of course, building more-
general libraries will require community consensus on
typical architectures, APIs, and protocols for negotiating
which obfuscation to use.
Increase the use of encryption. Recent efforts to expand
the use of standard encryption tools like TLS make it
harder to perform censorship. If most of the Internet is
end-to-end encrypted using TLS, then censors are harder
pressed to use DPI to detect content they wish to block.
Indeed we view improved censorship circumvention as
a nice ancillary benefit to the already laudable goal of
ubiquitous encryption on the Internet.
However, recall our earlier warning that encryption is
not a silver bullet for censorship circumvention. Partic-
ular applications that use common encryption protocols
can still be fingerprinted, often by information sent in
the clear such as headers, packet sizes, and timing.
Censors are also sometimes positioned to break end-
to-end security, performing man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attacks either by directly abusing the web’s public-
key infrastructure (as occurred in Turkey in 2012)6
or by forcing clients to install root certificates that
trick systems into allowing MitM proxies. The latter
is common in corporate settings already, and retooling
those solutions to nation-state levels is part of the threat
landscape that should be considered.
Simultaneously, encryption standards could do more
to support obfuscation. For example, they could encrypt
more of the handshake required during connection estab-
lishment. Ideally all bits emitted would be completely
random-looking to the censor. (This is targeted by the
obfs4 system.) If all TLS connections achieved this then
the entropy-based attacks discussed in Section IV would
no longer be effective.
VI. CONCLUSION
Censorship-circumvention technology is a relatively
young field of research but already has a wide diversity
of approaches and systems. This suggests the need to
reflect and consolidate what has been learned and to pro-
pose open questions to facilitate the field’s development.
Perhaps the most striking observation is that re-
searchers do not yet have a clear and common model
of the adversary. We also noted significant challenges
to understanding users and making obfuscation systems
robust to future attacks. These limitations are preventing
researchers from knowing whether or not a proposed
obfuscation method is vulnerable in practice (verses just
in theory); and whether a design has made appropriate
trade-offs between security, performance, ease of use, or
if it is failing to address user needs.
These are open questions in large part due to a surfeit
of methodological challenges faced by researchers in this
area. Chief among these are the difficulty of obtaining
access to network traffic without violating privacy, of
procuring DPI systems used by censors, and of per-
forming user studies within relevant populations. Such
challenges make principled progress difficult, but also
offer opportunities for creative workarounds. We sug-
gested some specific tasks and research directions that
the community might take up in order to make progress,
including developing guidelines for user studies and
building a shared lab for evaluating DPI capabilities.
6https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2013/01/
enhancing-digital-certificate-security.html
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Unfortunately Internet censorship will be around for
the foreseeable future. Researchers, activists, and gov-
ernments supporting the right to unfettered information
online should continue to work towards a future in which
network traffic obfuscation prevails in the face of so-
phisticated, well-provisioned censors. This will provide a
critical piece to the techno-social puzzle enabling people
around the world access to information.
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